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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
FILING TORT CLAIMS AGAINST DECEDENT'S
ESTATES WITHIN NON-CLAIM STATUTES:
A SURVEY
The question of whether claims founded on tort need be filed in
accordance with non-claim statutes as regards decedents' estates has
been a confused one in the area of probate law. Legislatures have not
usually dealt with the problem specifically. The courts in turn have had
difficulty in interpreting the wishes of the legislature because of the
circumspect language employed. Although statutory construction is an
important judicial function, the terminology used in many statutes
makes such construction difficult.
This article will attempt to analyze some of the various non-claim
statutes and judicial decisions which construe them, in order to discover
whether or not tort claims against decedents' estates need be filed, as
other claims must, within a specified time or be barred forever. Some
consideration will also be given to the question of whether or not filing
of tort claims should be required as a matter of policy in the orderly
administration of decedents' estates.
Historically non-claim statutes were restricted to claims arising
ex contractu rather than ex delicto.1 The reason generally given is that
the word "claim" refers to obligations which the decedent owed based
on a debtor-creditor relationship. Obviously then a tort claim cannot
be such a debt until reduced to judgment. In direct opposition to the
historical position of exclusion of tort claims from the provisions of
non-claim statutes, the California Legislature has provided for their in-
clusion. Prior to 1949, section 707 of the California Probate Code did
not require the presentation of claims grounded in tort against the
estates of decedents. In 1949, however, it was amended to read:
All claims arising upon a contract. .. and all claims for damages
for physical injuries or death or injury to property . . . must be
filed or presented within the time limited in the notice . . . and
any claim not so filed or presented is barred forever.2
Thus, California became one of the very few states which by legislation
compelled the filing of tort claims against decedents' estates. Whether
or not California's legislation in this area represents a trend is difficult
to perceive. Neither Oregon nor Nevada have precisely decided the
question, and their statutes employ the word "claim" without distin-
guishing contractual claims from tort claims.
3
1See, e.g. Payne v. Meisser, 176 Wis. 432, 187 N.W. 194 (1922); Will of
Heinemann, 201 Wis. 484, 230 N.W. 698 (1930); Lounsbury v. Eberlein, 2
Wis. 2d 112, 86 N.W. 2d 12 (1957).
2 CAL. PROB. ConE §707 (1949). E.g. Casey v. Katz, 114 Cal. App. 2d 391, 250
P. 2d 291 (1952); Halpert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 273 P. 2d 274
(1954).
3 ORE. REv. STAT. §116.510 (1961); NEV. REv. STAT. §147.040 (1961).
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The ambiguous quality of the word "claim" is, as we shall see, one
of the most vexing problems which the courts must solve, especially in
light of the historical position. New Mexico, a sister state of California,
has not been as legislatively explicit in its non-claim statute, which again
provides only that "all claims must be filed within six months. .... .4
The result is that the courts of New Mexico have said: "We conclude
the statutes providing for the filing of claims . . . do not cover tort
claims. . . ."' The court follows the normally accepted rationale when
legislation is not explicit, that is, by referring the problem back to the
legislature:
The legislature may, if it desires uniformity in the time for filing
claims in the probate court and that for suits against executors
and administrators for torts of decedents, easily provide that the
latter must be brought within six months from the appointment
of the administrator or the qualification of the executor.,
This statement, couched as it were in terms of a directive to the legis-
lature, could hardly be regarded as merely a subtle prompting of legis-
lative action. In Oklahoma, the same result is reached where the statute
refers only to "claims ' 7 even where the claim is based on a fraud where
the state is suing to recover old age assistance payments allegedly wrong-
fully obtained by decedent-recipient. The Texas court has followed the
same pattern by stating:
Non-claim statutes do not require that contingent or unliquidated
claims for money, such as require the intervention of a jury to
ascertain the amount, be first presented to an executor before suit
thereon is authorized.9
A third example of a type of non-claim statute is found in South
Dakota. There the time limit for filing claims is four months after the
first publication of notice to creditors; the statute then requires:
All claims arising upon a contract whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice, and any claim not so filed is forever barred.' 0
In interpreting this statute, the South Dakota court considered the argu-
ment put forth by the administrators that since the object of statutory
provisions requiring claims to be presented is to apprise the administrator
and the court of their existence, so that proper and timely arrangement
for payment can be made, there exists therefore no reason for not ap-
4 N.M. STAT. _NN. §33-802 (1941, Comp.).
5 Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P. 2d 671 (1952).6ld., 248 P. 2d at 675.
758 OKLA. STAT. §341 PROBATE COURT CoDE (1951); Gottsch v. Ireland, 358
P. 2d 1097 (Okla. 1961).8 Becker v. State, 312 P. 2d 935 (Okla. 1957).
9 Allen v. Denk, 87 S.W. 2d 303 (Tex. 1935).
10 S.D. CODE §35.1404 (Supp. 1960).
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plying the provisions of the statute to tort claims as well as claims
founded on contract. The court responded with this statement:
• . .it is not our function to determine what ought to be. The
language of the statutes now before us is plain and unambigu-
ous. We must construe the law as we find it.11
As a general rule those states whose statutes specifically refer to filing
claims "arising upon a contract" will not, by negative inference, require
filing of tort claims. Among states holding this position are: Arizona,12
Minnesota,1 3 North Dakota, 4 South Dakota, 5 Idaho, 6 and Utah.'7
The problem area concerns those states in which the non-claim
statute makes no reference to the type of claim which must be filed.
In these states the courts have gone to great length in justifying the
exclusion or inclusion of tort claims within the meaning of their re-
spective non-claim statutes. A representative example is Montana where
the court in finding that the non-claim statute did not apply to tort claims
stated that as to these claims there was:
• ..nothing fixed or definite upon which the administrator or
executor could act; and, necessarily, any such claims must first
be reduced to judgment establishing their validity and the amount
to be paid from the assets of the estate.' 8
In Tennessee, only three types of claims are provided for by
statute :19 those evidenced by a written instrument, by a judgment or
decree of the court, or by open account. Therefore, the Tennessee Court,
again by negative inference, feels that a tort claimant cannot be deemed
a "creditor" until he obtains a judgment.' 0 The Mississippi Court has
often stated that their non-claim statute applies only to contractual
claims and not to those in tort.21 The Wisconsin Court has also found
that a tort claim need not be filed within the period specified by the non-
claim statute." Delaware has construed the word "claim" in its non-
claim statute to mean a "sum justly and truly due." 23 The conclusion is
inescapable that since tort liability of a decedent during the administra-
tion of his estate cannot be such a sum, the tort claimant is not within
the purview of the statute unless his claim is reduced to judgment.
"1 Olson v. Altemus, 77 S.D. 429, 93 N.W. 2d 7, 9 (1958),
12 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §14-570 (1956).
'3 MINN. STAT. ANN. §525.411 (1945).
14 N.D. CENT. CODE §30-18-04 (1960).
15 Note 10 supra.
26 IDAHO CODE ANN. §15-604 (1947).
IT UTAH CODE ANN. §75-9-4 (1953).
28 Hornbeck v. Richards, 80 Mont. 27, 257 Pac. 1025 (1927).
'9 TENN. CODE ANN. §30-704 (1955).20 Collins v. Rufner, 185 Tenn. 290, 206 S.W. 2d 298 (1947).
2"Hancock v. Pyle, 191 Miss. 546, 3 So. 2d 851 (1941); Mossler Acceptance
Co. v. Moore, 218 Miss. 757, 67 So. 2d 868 (1953).22 Lounsbury v. Eberlein, 2 Wis. 2d 112, 86 N.W. 2d 12 (1957).
2sWilmington Trust Co. v. Wright, 33 D. Ch. 63, 90 A. 2d 480 (1952).
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A number of states have yet to pass on the question of whether tort
claims, would or would not be included in their respective non-claim
statutes. This group includes: Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia,
and West Virginia. Thus some sixteen states have decided that tort
claims need not be filed within the time required by non-claim statutes.
In addition at least twelve states have made no judicial pronouncement
on the matter, and the wording of the particular statutes leaves only
conjecture as to which position they would ultimately take.
Looking to the other side of the ledger, in addition to the California
position previously discussed, we find the same variances in statutory
language which allow the courts to find tort claims included within the
meaning of the non-claim statute of the particular state. Alabama has
decided that since tort claims have not been specifically excepted by the
terms of the statute, they are therefore included. 24 In Arkansas, the non-
claim statute has been strictly construed so as to disallow a tort claim
which was not filed in the probate court within the time prescribed;
although the executor had notice of pendency of action, because of
service of process on him.25 In New Hampshire, no action may be
commenced against an executor or administrator unless a demand is
exhibited to him within one year after original grant of administration.
Since this applies to tort actions as well as to other claims, the mere
commencement of action setting forth a claim in common counts was
not a sufficient exhibit of the demand to meet the statutory require-
ments.28 The New Jersey court explains its reason for deciding that
tort claims come within the purview of their statute by stating:
It is obvious that an executor may be obligated to wait for the
statute of limitation to operate before settling the estate, or to
resort to tedious and expensive chancery litigation, if a tort claim
is exempt from an 'order to limit creditors.' So in this respect
the object of the act would be defeated, if it is not applicable to
a claim in tort. When we turn to the statute itself, we find it
contains ample indicia of an intent to include all claims enforce-
able by suit terminating in a money judgment. 7
In a recent Nebraska decision, the court found that a tort claim is an
unliquidated and unestablished claim for damages and may not be re-
garded as "property"; therefore, such claim cannot be regarded as a
direct interest in the estate in the absence of fixation of damages. Only
if such claim were reduced to judgment would such claimant be en-
titled to statutory notice, and be subject to the time restriction for filing
24ALA. CODE Tit. 61, §211 (1940); Moore v. Stephens, 264 Ala. 86, 84 So. 2d
752 (1956).
25 Turnerv. Meek, 225 Ark. 744, 284 S.W. 2d 848 (1955).
26Vanni v. Cloutier, 100 N.H. 272, 124 A. 2d 204 (1956).
27 Forwood v. Green's Estate, 42 N.J. Super. 423, 126 A. 2d 667 (1956) quoting
Hackensack Trust Co. v. Van Den Berg, 92 N.J. L. 412, 105 Atl. 719 (1918).
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claims.28 Ohio, as does California, makes specific reference in their
statute to tort claims, requiring them to be presented within four months
of date of appointment of executor or administrator.29
Generally, all courts are agreed that tort claims are not contingent
claims within the meaning of non-claim statutes and, therefore, what-
ever exceptions to the requirements for time of filing of contingent
claims do not apply to tort claims. For instance, in an early Rhode
Island case it was held that a contingent claim within the meaning of
the non-claim statute is one that depends for its effect upon some fu-
ture event which may or may not happen. Since the event giving rise to
the tort claim has already happened, such claim cannot be contingent
even though the question of liability has yet to be determined.30 It is
interesting to note that a tort claimant will argue that his claim is con-
tingent if a statute will afford a special exception to a filing of contingent
claims; on the other hand a tort claimant will vociferously deny that his
claim is contingent in order to avoid filing at all, in those states whose
provisions are not clear as to whether any tort claims need be filed.
Another state that has strictly construed its statute is Washington
where it was said, as early as 1925, that "it applies to claims of every
kind and nature."''1 When the court was faced with the problem of
whether equitable estoppel might lie to prevent the bar of the statute
from being raised, it refused to make any exception:
In keeping with the legislative spirit, this court has made no
exceptions to the statute, and to now do so on the theory of
equitable estoppel would be to drive an entering wedge which
will tend to confusion and delay.32
While on the subject of equitable relief from the requirements of
non-claim statutes, it is important to note decisions in Iowa and New
Hampshire. Although both of these states require the filing of tort
claims within the time limited by their respective non-claim statutes,
they have in addition a saving statutory provision which allows for late
filing of claims when "peculiar circumstances entitle the claimant to
equitable relief"33 or when "justice and equity require it.''34 Generally,
the plaintiff-claimant has the burden of showing that he was not guilty
of culpable neglect in not filing his claim. In New Hampshire this bur-
den was met by a showing that because of continuing negotiation with
decedent's insurer, claimant believed mistakenly, without fault on his
28 In re Smith's Estate, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W. 2d 537 (1963).
29 OH Io GEN. CODE §10509-112 (1940); Robinson v. Engle, 96 Ohio App. 238,
120 N.E. 2d 611 (1953).
30 Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268, 94 Atl. 872 (1915); see also, Lounsbury v.
Eberlein, note 22 sup ra.
31 Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124, 237 Pac. 21, 22 (1925).32 Id., 237 Pac. at 24.
33 IOWA CODE §635.68 (1962).
3 N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. §556:28 (1955).
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part, that a demand would not be required as preliminary to bringing
a tort action. Therefore, the claimant was allowed to bring the action.35
Similarly in Iowa, it was held that representations made by adjusters for
the insurer issuing auto liability policy covering the decedent, led claim-
ant to believe that a settlement would be made. After the statutory time
had elapsed, the insurer denied liability and refused to negotiate. 36
A troublesome statutory designation is the word "creditor" as ap-
plied in non-claim statutes. Massachusetts has decided that a tort claim-
ant is a "creditor" within the meaning of its statutory provision.37 Penn-
sylvania has attempted to provide a clue by means of the commissions'
comment to one of their non-claim statutes:
The word 'claimant' rather than 'creditor' is employed to in-
clude persons claiming on a tort as well as those claiming under
contract.
3
Approximately twenty-one states appear to require the filing of tort
claims against decedents' estates within the requirements of the various
non-claim statutes of each state.39 This group obviously represents no
clear majority favoring this view. Indeed it would be difficult to predict
that the trend is moving in this direction.
One obvious reason why states are reluctant to modify their long
favored position of requiring only the filing of claims arising from con-
tract is a complicated machinery involving the jurisdiction of probate
courts. A glimpse into the problem is given by a Michigan case. In
order to allow the probate court jurisdiction to try claims based on tort,
the Supreme Court of Michigan held that since no exception was made
for claims in tort according to the language of the statute, therefore:
... it was the purpose and true intent of the legislature in enact-
ing the present probate code to make it optional upon the part of
the claimant to file a claim based upon a tort in the probate court
or file a tort action in the circuit court.40
Again in Illinois, it was held that by instituting tort actions in Circuit
and Superior Courts a claimant had followed proper procedure, since
the Probate Court was without jurisdiction to try the claims, although
35 Note 26 supra.
36 Cave v. Fahan, 249 Iowa 1374, 92 N.W. 2d 434 (1958); cf. Des Moines
Transp. Co. v. Haring, 238 Iowa 395, 27 N.W. 2d 210 (1947) and Rindfleisch
v. Mundt Estate, 247 Iowa 1124, 77 N.W. 2d 643 (1956).
3 White v. Cormier, 311 Mass. 537, 42 N.E. 2d 256 (1942).
38 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §320.616, Commissions' comment (1958).39 In addition to those already mentioned the list must include: Florida, Toney
v. Adair, 120 S. 2d 622 (Fla. 1960) ; Georgia, Gross v. Shankle, 97 Ga. App.
631, 104 S.E. 2d 145 (1958); Illinois, In re Collignon's Estate, 333 Il1. App.
562, 77 N.E. 2d 841 (1948); Indiana, Woods v. Klobuchar, 14 C.C.H. 2d
Auto, 1196, 257 F. 2d 313 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Kansas, In re Whittlesley's Estate,
156 Kan. 157, 131 P. 2d 911 (1942); Missouri, Helliker v. Brain, 277 S.W. 2d
556 (Mo. 1955); New York, In re Zutell's Will, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1961);
Wyoming, Lindsay v. Collins, 96 F. Supp. 994 (D. Wyo. 1951).
40 Chabere v. Page, 299 Mich. 278, 299 N.W. 82 (1941).
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the claims were filed with the Probate Court within the statutory pe-
riod.41 It appears that where a Probate Court is without jurisdiction
to try tort claims against decedents' estates, it is a probable deterrent to
requiring such claims to be filed. The problem was solved by a Kansas
court which held that the Probate Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
tort claims against decedents' estates and therefore sustained a de-
murrer to the action brohght in District Court.42 Thus in Kansas, at
least, no constitutional prohibition was found which would prohibit pro-
bate courts from adjudicating claims founded on tort.
In addition to jurisdictional problems, three areas of policy come
to mind. Although the courts have been reluctant to discuss policy in
the cases, nevertheless they must play a major role in influencing the
decisions which either include tort claims or exclude them. The first of
these is the status of the tort claimant. The question arises whether he
stands in a peculiar relation to the decedent, such that it is manifestly
unfair to treat a tort claimant in the same manner as a contractual
claimant. Most non-claim statutes provide for filing within one year
from the granting of letters or from first notice to creditors (usually
three to six months). The effect of such a short period for allowing
claims to be filed is to force a tort claimant to act more quickly than may
be practicable. Indeed, some tort claimants (those whose claims arise
from personal injury caused by the decedent) may still find themselves
in the hospital when the non-claim period expires. At least it can be
said that the extent of injuries to the claimant will be difficult to ascer-
tain within such a restricted time period. The problems of determining
possible permanent disability and pain and suffering, which characterize
the typical personal injury action, tend to place the tort claimant in a
class by himself. In addition, the calculation of damages may be difficult
to achieve when claims for medical expenses and loss of wages are
purely speculative. If the rationale for requiring tort claims to be filed
is to make the court and the executor aware of the possible debts of the
decedent so that payment may be arranged, it is hardly likely that a
claim for damages made within four months of an auto accident will
truly reflect the alleged liability of the decedent.
The second policy area concerns the orderly and expeditious admin-
istration of estates. By requiring tort claims to be filed, an executor will
be made aware of the possible solvency or insolvency of the estate and
the distributees will be protected both against unreasonable delay in
making distribution because of reservation of assets and also against the
possibility of a suit by a tort claimant after distribution. However, even
if tort claims are required to be filed it may not expedite the closing of
the estate. Indeed the opposite effect may be reached, that is, that the
41 In re Collignon's Estate, 333 Ill. App. 363, 77 N.E. 2d 841 (1948).
42 Shively v. Burr, 157 Kan. 336, 139 P. 2d 401 (1943).
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estate will have to be kept open until the claim is reduced to judgment.
This could mean a prolonged period of waiting due to congested court
calendars unless the probate court could try the tort action immediately.
The third policy consideration involves protection of executors and
administrators from personal liability on tort actions which may be
commenced after distribution of the assets. In the normal situation, it
seems improbable to this writer that an administrator will be so ignorant
of his decedent's affairs that he will close the estate and make distribu-
tion without realizing the existence of tort claims presently dormant.
When a probate court has made an order for payment and an executor
has acted pursuant to such order and has made distribution accordingly,
it appears doubtful that an administrator will still be subject to suit on
a claim not filed nor required to be filed. 43 It is highly unlikely that
administrators and executors will refrain from closing estates until the
statute of limitations has run on tort actions. The problem of protection
for administrators may be more acute when a decedent carries no in-
surance or is under-insured. Insurance coverage is a factor which, to
a great extent, eases the problem of expeditious administration of es-
tates. It would appear that the presence of liability insurance promotes
settlement of many tort claims without resort to litigation. From a prac-
tical standpoint, the administrator usually has all the protection he needs
by virtue of liability insurance which decedents often carry.
In light of this discussion we must turn to New York where a com-
promise appears to have been reached by statutory enactment.44
Under sec. 208 of the Surrogate's Court Act, if a claim is not
made within seven months after the issuance of letters of ad-
ministration, the administratrix shall not be chargeable for the
satisfaction of claims or distribution of assets to the next of kin
prior to the presentation of such a claim. However, the law is
clear that sec. 208 protects only a fiduciary who distributes the
assets in good faith and without the knowledge of any existing
claims against the estate. 45
In this case the New York court commented obiter dicta that even if the
contingent claimant sought a measure of damages in a fixed amount,
a direction for reservation of assets based upon the relief sought would
be of doubtful validity. However, since the claimant did not timely file
his affidavit, he is precluded from enforcing his judgment against the
administratrix some eight years later. However, New York provides
means for reaching assets in the hands of distributees by virtue of
section 170 of the Decedent Estate Law.46 The question arises as to
what assets are apt to be remaining in the hands of distributees eight
years after distribution.
43 See, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 652 for a criticism of the Wisconsin position.
44 In re Zutell's Will, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1961).
451d. at 292.
46 Id. at 293.
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After viewing the problem of filing tort claims from the standpoint
of the three interested parties-the claimant, the administrator and the
distributee, this writer feels that it may be more desirable to require the
filing of tort claims within the non-claim statute. The effect of requiring
such filing appears to be more beneficial than harmful. It may bring
about settlement of such claims with more speed since there will be
pressure both from the administrators' position and from the claim-
ant's. Requiring tort claims to be filed cannot help but secure a more
efficient administration of estates, but the problem of what will happen
after the filing of the claim cannot be overlooked. In the process of
balancing the interests of all the parties concerned, finding the appropri-
ate method to accomplish this objective is a task which is still to be
carried out by many legislatures even to this date.
ROBERT L. HERSH
